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State Responsibility in the
Regulation of Atomic Reactors
By DAVD F. CAvERs *
In the statutory scheme for dividing regulatory responsibilities
with respect to atomic energy between the federal government
and qualified states, control over atomic reactors has been retained
by the federal government." Probably its power to license reactors
is exclusive. In my judgment, this represents a wise allocation of
authority, and I shall present in this article the principal reasons
for that opinion. I shall also examine the role that a state in which
a reactor is proposed to be built can play in the licensing process,
as well as the state's position once the reactor is in operation.
Finally, I shall consider how far the allocation to the federal
government of regulatory power over reactors with respect to
health and safety may deprive states of control of reactors that
they wish to exercise for other purposes.
THE STATTtoRY SCHEm
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which first made the private
ownership of atomic reactors legally possible, was singularly
silent as to the Act's effect on state authority with respect to the
facilities and materials over which it gave the federal government
far-reaching regulatory power to be exercised chiefly through the
medium of licensing. If one granted the constitutionality of this
* Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
'The statutory basis of federal authority is the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1958 Supp. II, 1960) [hereinafter
cited as Act]. After providing for the discontinuance of federal authority
pursuant to agreements with the states, § 274 preserves federal authority over
"production and utilization facilities." Act, § 274, ch. 1, 78 Stat. 689 (1959), 42
U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1960). Reactors (including "critical facilities")
comprise as yet the only type of facility to be regulated as such. Fuel element
fabrication plants are not yet subject to licensing, and there is still no non-
government plant for the chemical reprocessing of spent elements. Waste disposal
poses an important regulatory problem, but it involves the licensing of materials
rather than facilities. In both legal and practical terms, the problem considered
in this article is most consequential with respect to power and test, as distin-
guished from research reactors, but to avoid the repetitious specification of these
types, I shall usually refer in this article simply to reactors.
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sweeping assertion of federal power, including monopolization
of the ownership of all special nuclear materials,2 it followed, on
familiar constitutional principles, that any state regulation con-
flicting with a federal regulation was invalid. However, less
assurance was possible concerning the Act's effect on a state
regulation which was compatible with (perhaps identical to) a
federal regulation. Should the 1954 Act be deemed to have pre-
empted the field of control so fully as to have left no room for
any exercise of state power, despite the fact that the area effected
-public health and safety-is one with which the states and their
political subdivisions have traditionally been concerned?
The question had received no definitive answer in the courts3
when in 1959, Congress, by adding section 274 to the Atomic
Energy Act, undertook "to clarify the respective responsibilities
under this Act of the States and the Commission." The scheme is
one with which readers of this symposium will have been made
familiar by other articles; my special concern is with subsection
c of section 274, which provides:
c. No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection b.
shall provide for discontinuance of any authority and the
Commission shall retain authority and responsibility with
respect to regulation of-
(1) the construction and operation of any production
or utilization facility; ... ,
If the original 1954 Act, properly construed, had left to the
states concurrent authority to impose, say, regulations identical
2For a thorough examination of the possible bases of federal power, see
Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private
Atomic Energy Activities, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1954).3 In Boswell v. City of Long Beach, 1 CCH Atom. Energy L. Rep. ff 4056,
the Los Angeles, California Superior Court held that the city lacked power to
forbid the operation of an AEC-licensed waste disposal plant within its borders.
In the Matter of Industrial Waste Disposal Corp., Docket No. 27-9, 2 CCH Atom.
Energy L. Rep. if 11,462, the AEC refused to pass on the validity of a Houston,
Texas, ordinance forbidding activities for which an AEC license was being sought,
observing that if an attempt were made to enforce the ordinance, "the issue
would then be before the courts." In Stone v. Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm'n,
2 CCH Atom. Energy L. Rep. 1 8528 (Pa. Super Ct., June 15, 1960), the court
upheld an order of the Public Utility Commission authorizing eminent domain for
a nuclear reactor's transmission line, refusing to consider a contention that the
reactor (Peach Bottom) was "not a proven safe unit" and noting that the AEC
was charged with overseeing the safety of reactors.4 Act, § 274(a)(1), 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) (Supp. IL
1960).5 Act, § 274, ch. 1, 73 Stat. 691 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (Supp.
II 1960).
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to federal regulations with respect to atomic facilities,6 this
amendment by its terms did not deprive the states of that
authority. On its face all that subsection c appears to do is to
preserve certain areas of authority for the federal government
which might otherwise have been discontinued by the agreements
with the states authorized by subsection b. However, though the
statutory draftsmen were careful to avoid any explicit-and pos-
sibly impolitic-assertion of exclusive federal power in the statu-
tory language, the report of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy (JCAE) to accompany the bill made plain JCAE's sup-
position that the federal government alone had enjoyed regulatory
power under the 1954 Act.7 Whether the draftsmen would have
been proved correct if that supposition could have been tested in
the courts before their amendment was adopted, the amendment
itself, given its legislative history, leaves little ground on which
opponents of exclusive federal authority can stand.
I was among those who, before section 274, saw a place for
state regulation with respect to radioactive materials while be-
lieving that, under the existing law, federal authority should be
recognized as exclusive with respect to the licensing of facilities."
However, in my judgment, section 274, in subsection c, must be
viewed as asserting the retention of an existing exclusive federal
power over reactors and other "production and utilization facili-
ties."
Even by one who agrees with that judgment, the question it
answers need not be viewed as foreclosed for all time. In adopting
section 274, the Congress has opened the door part way to com-
patible state regulation; perhaps it should go further. The state
6 The validity of this construction is certainly open to challenge. The case
going furthest in its support is California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
7 See S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The report states at
pp. 8-9:
Licensing and regulation of more dangerous activities-such as nuclear re-
actors-will remain the exclusive responsibility of the Commission. It is not
intended to leave room for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by
States to control radiation hazards by regulating by-product, source, or special
nuclear materials. The intent is to have the material regulated and licensed
by the Commission, or by the State and local governments, but not by both.
Commenting on subsection k, the report states at p. 12:
Tihe Commission has exclusive authority to regulate for protection against
radiation hazards until such time as the State enters into an agreement with
the Commission to assume such responsibility.
8 See Cavers, Legislative Readjustments in Federal and State Regulatory
Powers over Atomic Energy, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 22, 29 (1958).
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of Minnesota has already asserted its right to pass on reactor
facilities to be built or operated within its bounds and to disap-
prove those which the Minnesota Board of Health regards as
endangering the public healthY If a number of other states were
to adopt a similar attitude, the issue would almost certainly reach
the Congress before it reached the courts.
SHOULD STATES BE A T TomzEDz TO LIcENsE Bcros?
The question before the Congress could be answered in the
light of a growing body of experience in the licensing of atomic
facilities, particularly power and test reactors as to which the
Congress in 1957 imposed certain procedural safeguards. 10 The
operation of the AEC's regulatory authority has recently been the
subject of three studies-one by the AEC itself,"- another by the
JCAE staff12 and a third by the University of Michigan Law
School's Atomic Energy Research Project.13 On the basis of these
studies, there were hearings before the JCAE in June of this
year.'4 The information provided through these channels, though
directed to another issue, reinforces the view that the licensing
of reactors should remain an exclusive federal responsibility.
Certainly it would be hard to defend the discontinuance of
federal jurisdiction to license the construction and operation of
reactors. The federal government has both special interests and
special qualifications for that task. It has invested billions of
9 Minn. State Bd. of Health, Reg. on Ionizing Radiation, Reg. 1158 ("Nu-
clear reactors and facilities"), 3 CCH Atom. Energy L. Rep. fT 17,895h, reprinted
in Staff of TCAE, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Selected Materials on Federal-State Co-
operation in the Atomic Energy Field 188-90 (Tt. Comm. Print. March 1959). The
statutory base for these regulations is a slender one. A grant to the board to
control listed matters by requiring licenses or permits (Minn. Stat. 1953, § 144.12)
was enlarged by Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 361, which added to the list "(15)
sources of ionizing radiation and the handling, storage, transportation, use and
disposal of radioactive isotopes and fissionable materials."
10 Act, § 182(b), 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2232(b) (Supp. II,
1960); Act, § 189(a), 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (Supp. II, 1960).
"1AEC, The Regulatory Program of the Atomic Energy Commission, in 2
Staff of TCAE, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. Improving the AEC Regulatory Process,
87-393 (Jt. Comm. Print. March 1961) [hereinafter cited as JCAE Staff Study];
AEC, Report on the Regulatory Program of the Atomic Energy Commission in 2
ICAE Staff Study 395-421.
12 1 TCAE Staff Study. I served as consultant to the JCAE staff. The opinions
expressed in this article are my personal views and not necessarily the staff's.
13 Berman & Hydeman, The Atomic Energy Commission and Regulating
Nuclear Facilities (1961). The Introduction, §§ C and D of Part I, and Part HI
of this study are reprinted in 2 ICAE Staff Study 425-557.
14 Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation Before the JCAE, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961).
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dollars in the development of atomic energy, and, in the long run,
its hope for any substantial return on that investment (military
uses excepted) must rest on the achievement of economic methods
of utilizing nuclear fuels for atomic power. Progress toward that
goal could be set back by regulatory authorities in either of two
ways: by the careless or inexpert scrutiny of reactor designs and
operating procedures, followed by a reactor "incident" seriously
damaging an exposed community; or by the imposition of unneces-
sary and costly precautionary requirements rendering economic
power an impossibility. The federal government can properly
claim special standing to protect against both of these risks.
Moreover, since most large-scale reactors are a source of special
nuclear materials from which bombs could, after reprocessing, be
manufactured, the federal government has reason for concern as
to the integrity and efficiency of both the reactors and their
operators.
However, to say that the federal government ought to retain
authority to license reactors does not automatically rule out the
aspirations of Minnesota if it is prepared to impose no stricter
standards than the federal government. The critical question is
whether concurrent jurisdiction should be permitted. The objec-
tion to its rests on three points:
(1) It would be impossible to determine in advance whether
Minnesota's standards were more or less strict than the AEC's.
The complexity of atomic facilities is such that standardization,
even of the principal elements in their design, is a long way off.15
Decisions to license or not to license must be made on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, unless Minnesota were prepared to rubber-
stamp the AEC's decisions, its exercise of concurrent licensing
power might actually result in the imposition of stricter controls
than those imposed by the Federal agency.
(2) The process of securing federal licensing approval is so
burdensome now that measures to simplify it are being earnestly
sought. To require that a (more or less) parallel process be con-
ducted before a state agency would add to the already serious
'5 Cf. Testimony of Dr. C. K. Beck, Ass't. Director of the AEC Division of
Licensing and Regulation, Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation, supra
note 14 (1961); AEC, Report on the Regulatory Program of the Atomic Energy
Commission in 2 JCAE Staff Study 395, 418. For a more optimistic view, see
Kennedy & Heimann, The AEC Regulatory Process, in 2 ICAE Staff Study 558,
559.
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costs of the licensing process in terms of the applicant's time and
man-power and might readily lead to expensive delays in getting
the reactor built and into operation.
(8) The design of a power or test reactor to operate both
safely and economically is one of the most challenging tasks
confronting modem science and technology. The number of
people who command the theoretical and applied sciences which
must be drawn on in designing and in appraising the safety
features of such a facility is very small. Needless to say, the
services of men with these qualifications are much in demand.
One of the most difficult problems confronting the AEC and its
critics has been to assure that the licensing process will attract a
sufficient number of first-rate people to make safety analyses,
evaluations, and decisions. 6 If the AEC is encountering difficul-
ties in overcoming that problem, how could the states hope to
surmount it? It will be years before any one state can hope to
have enough licensing cases to justify the employment of a full-
time staff of experts, even if it could interest able people in the
service.
These points have often been asserted, but they may have the
ring of the Bureaucrat's selfserving declarations in defense of his
jurisdiction. To carry conviction, it may be necessary to turn to
an actual licensing case. For this purpose the AEC's study of its
own licensing procedures provides a convenient source of ma-
terial. That study combined a helpful survey of the AEC's regu-
latory procedures with "chronologies of the regulatory histories
of power and test reactors for which license applications have
been submitted."'7
Each chronology reports the sequence of "regulatory events"
which took place from the first contacts of the applicant with the
AEC staff to the issuance of the final operating license. The gen-
eral pattern, as the AEC has described it,'8 is a five-phase opera-
tion: (1) application submittal phase; (2) AEC staff review and
safety evaluation phase; (8) Advisory Committee for Reactor
16 See, e.g., 1 JCAE Staff Study 57, 62, 65; Reply From Atomic Industrial
Forum, Dated April 12, 1961, in Staff of ICAE, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Views and
Comments on Improving the AEC Regulatory Process 3, 6-7 (Jt. Comm. Print.
Tune 1961).
17 AEC, The Regulatory Program of the Atomic Energy Commission, 2 TCAE
Staff Study 170.
i8 Id. at 151 (chart).
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Safety (ACRS) safety evaluation phase; (4) hearing phase; and
(5) final action phase. However, the number of regulatory events
within any phase may be numerous. Consider for example, the
chronology of the licensing of the Yankee Atomic Electric reactor,
constructed by a group of New England electric power com-
panies at Rowe, Massachusetts, and currently in full-scale opera-
tion. 19
In June 1956, Yankee Atomic entered into a contract with the
AEC for substantial research aid and a 5-year waiver of the AEC's
4% use charge for nuclear fuel. This contract was entered into
under the Power Demonstration Reactor Program which the AEC
had initiated over a year earlier; agreement was reached only
after Yankee had modified its reactor concept materially in order
to satisfy the Program's objectives.20
In July 1956, Yankee filed its application for a construction
permit and two months later its representatives met with mem-
bers of the AEC licensing staff and an ACRS representative to
discuss the application. In October, Yankee submitted additional
information on the fuel elements it proposed to use. In December
the AEC staff requested more information on fuel requirements.
In January and February 1957, Yankee filed Amendments Nos. 1
and 2 to its application. In April it filed Amendment No. 8 and its
Preliminary Hazards Summary Report (a document of about 400
typed pages)21 During this period of nearly a year, work was
going forward on the preliminary design of the reactor. This was
completed in June 1957; a month earlier, detailed design work had
begun.
In June 1957, the AEC staff again met with the applicant and
again requested additional information. In July, a meeting was
held with ACRS consultants to consider the Hazards Summary
Report. The ACRS report having been obtained, staff members
again met with the applicant. Finally, in September 1957, notice
of hearing was issued. After a further meeting that month, the
19 For the Yankee chronology, see id. at 218-25. Yankee has a 184,000 ekw
pressurized light water Westinghouse reactor.
20 See Hearings on the Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy
Industry Before the ICAE, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 762-63 (1957). For the
Yankee contract, see id. at 741-52.
21 The volume is not consecutively paged, and the original has since been
considerably enlarged by amendments. The estimate given is from company
sources. The supporting studies summarized in the Report are said to "fill a
bookshelf."
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ACRS reported to the AEC that the preliminary design of the
reactor was suitable. A public hearing before a hearing examiner
was held during October, and early in November, a provisional
construction permit was issued, 16 months after the date of the
application. Construction was begun November 15, 1957.
The foregoing covers 20 "regulatory events," the term used by
the AEC chroniclers to identify the individual steps comprising
their chronologies. It would be tedious to continue the enumera-
tion. Suffice it to note that the licensing process narrated to this
point represented only a good beginning. The chronicle came to
an end (though the licensing process did not) in August 1960, a
total of 49 months after the date of application. Subsequent to
the issuance of the construction permit, there had been 47 more
regulatory events, for a total of 67.
To aid the reader of the Yankee chronology, the AEC report
includes a table of the amendments filed to both the Application
and the Construction Permit.22 There were 23 amendments to the
former, 4 to the latter. In addition I amendment to the Operating
License is listed. During the four years covered by the chronology,
Yankee matters were considered by the ACRS at 9 meetings, 2
of them being subcommittee meetings.
The Yankee chronology is neither the longest, the most com-
plex, nor the most contentious in the collection. If current pro-
posals for simplifying the AEC's licensing process for power and
test reactors are enacted by the Congress, 23 the route of another
application raising problems comparable to Yankee's would prob-
ably not be marked by as many formal proceedings or as many
references to the ACRS. However, there would doubtless be as
many references to the AEC staff and the same painstaking
inquiries and repeated requests for additional data. Each reactor
presents many new problems and the doctrine of precedent has
little place in hazards evaluation. 24
Now suppose the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had been
conducting an independent study of the Yankee reactor in order
22 2 JCAE Staff Study 226-31.2 3 The AEC, ICAE staff, and Berman-Hydeman studies all agree that not
more than one public hearing should be mandatory and that reference to the
ACRS should be on a selective basis. See AEC, Report on the Regulatory Program
of the Atomic Energy Commission, in 2 JCAE Staff Study 410; 1 ICAE Staff Study
49, 72; Berman & Hydeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at 826.
24 See Testimony of Dr. C. K. Beck, supra note 15.
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to determine whether to issue a license for its construction and
operation. Suppose the Massachusetts licensing body had adopted
the AEC's practice of issuing a provisional construction permit
before all the reactor's design and safety problems had been
ironed out, provided it had received "information sufficient to
provide reasonable assurance that a facility of the general type
proposed can be constructed and operated at the proposed loca-
tion without undue risk to the health and safety of the public"
(the standard employed by the AEC).25 Despite this parallel, is
it not obvious that the state and federal inquiries would diverge
at many points over the four years and that, even though the
applicant succeeded ultimately in satisfying the different require-
ments of the two bodies, it would have been subjected to greatly
increased hearing expense, the absorption of much scientific and
engineering staff time in meeting the dual demands, and the risk
of serious delay in its construction program? The added uncer-
tainties as to the end result would have complicated its financing
problem. Whatever the result, the reaction of the reactor's spon-
sors at the end of the road would probably be: "Never again!"
If the United States wants private enterprise to take part in
the development of an atomic power industry, surely the respon-
sibility for resolving the safety question should be entrusted to a
single government.
STATE PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL REACTOR LICENSING
The view that reactor licensing should be the exclusive re-
sponsibility of the federal government does not mean that a state
is helpless to influence the AEC's decision whether to permit or
forbid the construction and operation of a given reactor within
its territory. The interested state may take part in the decision-
making process, but it must do so as a participant in the licensing
proceeding. In view of the cost and difficulty of intervention in
reactor licensing cases, in all probability it is only the state-or a
major subdivision 6 -that is likely to have the necessary combina-
tion of interest and resources to take such action.
25 AEC, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R. § 50.35
(1959).2 6 For convenience, this article is written wholly in terms of the role of state
governments. However, a city or county might take a more active part than the
(Footnote continued on next page)
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Section 274, while excluding states from reactor licensing,
invites them to participate in the federal process. Subsection 1
requires the Commision, in matters as to which its authority is
preserved by subsection c, to "give prompt notice to the State
or States in which the activity shall be conducted of the filing of
the license application."27 Moreover, subsection 1 further requires
the Commission to "afford reasonable opportunity for State repre-
sentatives to offer evidence, interrogate witnesses, and advise the
Commission as to the application without requiring such repre-
sentatives to take a position for or against the granting of the
application."
This invitation raises a preliminary procedural question. Does
a state by accepting the invitation become a party to the pro-
ceeding and, in effect if not in name, an intervenor? Certainly
such a provision cannot be deemed to diminish the rights that a
state would have as an intervenor. The provision would seem to
relieve a state of the need to petition to intervene, but, since little
appears to turn on the point, I shall for convenience in the discus-
sion that follows refer to the state as an intervenor.
Despite the evident cordiality of the Congress toward state
intervention, one still may inquire whether intervention, even by
an intervenor state, is an empty or impracticable privilege in
reactor licensing cases. To answer that question, it may be help-
ful to pose three other questions. (1) Is the procedure calculated
to give the state in which it is proposed that a reactor be built
adequate notice? (2) Are the technical issues in a licensing case
so abstruse as to prevent a state from taking an effective part in
the proceedings? (8) Does the decision-making process provide
an adequate opportunity for an intervenor to influence the views
of the Commission?
Solid answers to these three questions cannot be predicated
on experience. To date there have been only two interventions
by a state in a reactor licensing case, and the state (Michigan in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
state in a reactor licensing case, as has been true in waste disposal matters. See,
e.g., Matter of Industrial Waste Disposal Corp., Docket No. 27-9, 2 CCH Atom.
Energy L. Rep. ff 11,462. Except for the special power given the state by § 274,
the comments made herein as to a state would ordinarily apply to its subdivisions.27 Act, § 274.1, 73 Stat. 691, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (i) (Supp. II, 1960).
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the Power Reactor Dev. Co. (PRDC )28 and the Consumer Power
Co. case)2 9 held, in effect, only a watching brief. Moreover, as
yet there has been active intervention only in one case, PRDC
(the intervenors being labor unions, chiefly the UAW), so that
little opportunity has been provided to develop a body of practice
with respect to intervention. At the risk of having to rely on
speculation for answers, I shall consider the three questions in
turn.
(1) Subsection 1 of section 274 may seem to solve the prob-
lem of notice.30 The statutory requirement will probably soon be
implemented, after a lag of nearly two years, by an amendment
to AEC's Rules of Practice to require the applicant to serve a
copy of its application on the chief executive of the municipality
or county in which the reactor is to be located.3' The AEC will
also undertake to send a copy to "the Governor or other appro-
priate official of the State in which the facility is to be located."
However, since the real problem is to enable the potentially
interested state to reach a judgment whether it would be justified
in taking an active role in the proceeding, the application alone
may not provide the necessary information.
Much progress toward a solution of this problem has been
made since 1956 when notice in the PRDC case was first given
by an AEC announcement that it was issuing a conditional con-
struction permit to PRDC to build the Fermi fast-breeder. The
ACRS report, which raised searching questions as to the reactor's
safety, was made public only by a familiar Washington technique:
it was leaked.82
28 2 CCH Atom. Energy L. Rep. 11 11, 201. The order of the court of appeals
remanding the case to the AEC, International Union v. Power Reactor Dev.
Co., 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1960), was reversed in Power Reactor Dev. Co.
v. International Union, 81 S.Ct. 1529 (1961). For the state's position (which
was not to be taken as approving or disapproving the project), see In the Matter
of Power Reactor Dev. Co., 2 CCH Atom. Energy L. Rep. Uf 7.103.
29 Docket No. 50-155. On March 25, 1961, the state of Michigan petitioned
to intervene for the purpose of observing the proceedings. On March 28, the
petition was granted and the Michigan Water Resources Commission was per-
mitted to enter a limited appearance. AEC, The Regulatory Program of the
Atomic Energy Commission, in 2 JCAE Staff Study 255.
3 0 Act, § 274.1, 73 Stat. 691 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(1) (Supp. II, 1960).31See 26 Fed. Reg. 5077 (Tune 7, 1961); 3 CCH Atom. Energy L. Rep.
Uf 14,047n.
=
2 Comm'r T. E. Murray, who had dissented from the order issuing the
construction permit, unilaterally introduced a part of the ACRS report in an
(Footnote continued on next page)
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In response to the criticism aroused by that case and to 1957
amendments to the Act requiring hearings and public dissemina-
tion of the ACRS report,3 3 the AEC adopted the practice of mak-
ing public the staff hazards analysis at the time the 30-day notice
of hearing was issued. This would enable an interested public or
private body to engage experts to decide whether further investi-
gation was called for. However, the preparation of the staff
analysis was time-consuming. Rather than risk having to defer
the hearing, the AEC began making the analysis available only
after the notice had issued, gradually reducing the already short
time for decision by a possible intervenor. Spurred by JCAE
inquiries, the Commission last winter was reported by the JCAE
staff "to be giving careful study to the problem of the adequacy
of public notice of hearings and expects in the near future to make
substantial improvements in the notice procedures, particularly
with respect to local governments and officials."3 4 If the notice
provisions quoted above are to be the only fruits of this study,
they scarcely seem sufficient.
To enable interested states and other public bodies to de-
termine the course they should take with respect to an application,
it would be advantageous for them to have ready access to the
applicant's preliminary hazards summary report and to the analy-
sis the staff prepares for consideration by the ACRS. A compari-
son of the latter document with the ACRS report would sometimes
throw much more light on the problems that have concerned
both bodies than does the ACRS report itself, a brief and often
enigmatic document.
The reality of the difficulty confronting the state which seeks
to play a responsible part in the licensing process is illustrated
by the action of the Secretary of Health in Pennsylvania, Dr. C. L.
Wilbar, who wrote the Philadelphia Electric Company for addi-
tional data concerning the reactor the company is building at
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Appropriations hearing. As knowledge of the ACES position spread, the TCAE
demanded the release of the report. The AEC withstood this pressure for three
months and then released the report, confessing that it had made a mistake. The
ICAE-AEC correspondence is set forth in A Study,' of AEC Procedures and
Organization in Licensing of Reactor Facilities in Staff of ICAE, 85th Cong., ist
Sess., 117-22 (Jt. Comm. Report 1957).
a3 Supra note 11.
34 1 TCAE Staff Study 54 n. For the staff criticism, see id. at 53.
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Peach Bottom, Pennsylvania. Dr. Wilbar declared that the Health
Department would have to intervene if more data on the points
he specified were not forthcoming."
Notice provided by technical documents would, of course, do
little to alert the general public as to the nature of the safety
problems under consideration. Therefore, it has been suggested
that a public conference "somewhat in the nature of a press con-
ference" be held by the AEC near the site of a reactor it had
been asked to license.3 6 At this conference, AEC representatives
would seek to explain the nature of the reactor and presumably
the reasons why it regarded the reactor as safe. Apart from the
question whether such a conference could be an effective medium
for communicating meaningfully to the public, the question that
had concerned the experts,37 the procedure puts the AEC in the
role of defending before the public a reactor the safety of which
it has yet to determine. Such a proceeding would therefore add
to whatever bias in favor of the reactor the AEC's prior dealings
with the applicant might have created. If such a public meeting
is to be held, I believe the presentation of the case for the reactor
should be left to the applicant. I therefore view with some mis-
givings a public meeting the AEC has experimentally scheduled
in Pleasanton, California, near the site of the Vallecitos reactor, to
test this medium of communication in connection with the licen-
sing of a nuclear superheater there . 8
(2) In arguing that states should not be allowed to establish
their own licensing systems for reactors, I emphasized how dif-
ficult were the technical problems posed and how hard a state
would find the development of a staff capable of reaching an inde-
pendent judgment as to the safety of a proposed reactor. In so
35 BNA, Atomic Ind. Rep., News and Analysis, 6:836.
30 Reply from Prof. Kenneth Culp Davis, University of Minnesota Law School,
dated April 19, 1961 in Staff of JCAE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 25.37 Dr. T. J. Thompson, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,
in Panel Discussion, Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation, supra note 14,
Tune 15, 1961:
I seriously doubt that it is possible to read into the record testimony which is
complete enough to be technically valid on safety features of such a highly
technical piece of hardware as a nuclear power reactor while still making it
simple enough so that the man on the street can really understand what is
happening.
38 Plans for such a conference were announced in Testimony of Comm'r L. K.
Olson and questioned by the author in Panel Discussion, Hearings on Radiation
Safety and Regulation, supra note 14, Tune 15, 1961.
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doing, have I simultaneously established the impracticability of a
state's active participation in a licensing proceeding as an inter-
venor? I do not think so.
There are important differences between the roles of the
intervenor and the decision-maker. The most obvious is the fact
that the intervenor does not have to make the decision. A person
or a public body may be unable to command sufficient expertise
to justify entrusting it with decision-making powers and yet be
capable of posing and pressing some very tough questions for the
decision-maker to resolve. Another significant difference is that
the decision-maker must be capable of evaluating all the facets of
a proposed reactor's safety and so must employ experts in a
correspondingly wide range of disciplines. The intervenor can,
in contrast, give the applicant and the decision-maker the benefit
of the doubt with respect to 95% of the questions raised by a
reactor and concentrate on the 5% which, in the eyes of the
intervenor's experts, pose the greatest threat to safety. With the
target thus narrowed, the intervenor can direct its experts' probing
to problems of manageable dimensions.
It is with respect to the suitability of a reactor's proposed site
that an intervenor state is likely to be most effective. Siting prob-
lems are usually tackled at a very early stage in a reactor's history,
well before the completion of even the preliminary design. At
this point, a state could present both technical argument and
policy considerations for or against the proposed site without
getting deeply into specific questions of reactor design. 9 There
are some sites, for example, that are not desirable even for as safe
a power reactor as we are currently able to design.40
Many states have in the faculties of universities within their
bounds nuclear physicists and engineers with sufficient knowledge
3 9 Dr. T. T. Thompson in Panel Discussion, id.
40 See Letter From ACRS to the AEC, June 30, 1960, on the Small Size Pres-
surized Water Reactor, proposed to be built by the AEC at a site near Jamestown,
N. Y.:
The Committee can find no serious technical fault with the reactor, the con-
tainment, and the safety features proposed, insofar as the partial information
supplied to date has presented the case. The Committee emphasizes, however,
that power reactors are relatively new and untried, and that there exists a
considerable degree of uncertainty in our knowledge of their long-term safe
behavior. Accordingly, the Committee doubts that the new and relatively
untried technical features for improved safety proposed by the applicant, since
our last report, are a satisfactory substitute for the inherent safety implied
by a greater distance from population centers.
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to make a preliminary assessment of a reactor application and
(hopefully) the applicant's hazards summary report, and, on this
basis, advise whether more searching scrutiny of the proposal is
indicated. An affirmative answer might, of course, lead to the
enlistment of other, possibly out-of-state, experts.
(3) Given an illuminating notice and the state's ability to
employ qualified personnel to study such problems as the notice
may have revealed, the question still must be faced: is interven-
tion that goes beyond being placed on the AEC's mailing list likely
to be worth while?
Almost certainly, in most cases of reactor licensing,41 the state
and its experts will be satisfied that there is no reason for active
intervention. But the single case in which the contrary proved
true might justify at least a preliminary look at the problems in
all the other cases. To be sure, the AEC has built up a capable
staff in its Hazards Evaluation Branch, and the ACRS is a body
of unusual ability.42 In addition, the reactor's designers will have
devoted careful study to the safety aspects of all features of their
design. But the quality of a staff is never constant, and the ACRS
may not long continue its case-by-case scrutiny of reactor applica-
tions. 43 The safety evaluation that seems so excellent now may
be much less impressive a year or two or three hence.
Moreover, as the licensing process is now set up, absent inter-
vention, there is no effective review of the merits of the safety
issue beyond that point in the process where the AEC licensing
staff and the applicant agree (with the approval of the ACRS)
that the application is ready to go to hearing. At that point, the
applicant and the staff will prepare testimony and proposed find-
ings which that testimony will support. The hearing examiner, a
lawyer, will take note that the evidence does support the proposed
findings, and ordinarily he will adopt them in substance. Though
41 The problem to which this article is addressed relates almost wholly to
power and test reactors. Very seldom does a research reactor require reference
to the ACRS, and so far they have all been licensed by the AEC Division of
Licensing and Regulation without a hearing. As of Nov. 80, 1960, nineteen
construction permits and forty-five operating licenses had been issued for
research reactors as against eight construction permits and five operating licenses
for power and test reactors. 1960 AEC Ann. Rep. 405.
42 For a list of its fifteen members (appointed by the Commission for a term
of four years) and the position held by each member, see id. at 309-10.
43 See supra note 23. See also Letter dated December 13, 1960 from Chair-
man, ACRS, to Chairman, AEC, in 2 ICAE Staff Study 590, 591.
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his job description may require it,44 he will lack the scientific
qualifications needed to make an independent evaluation of the
testimony and findings relating to the reactor's safety.45 Unless
the case happens to pose a procedural problem or a new question
as to the nature of the order to be issued, the examiner's inter-
mediate opinion directing the issuance of, say, a provisional con-
struction permit will evoke no exceptions from the applicant, and,
within 20 days, his order will become final.46 The Commission
may persist in its present practice of reviewing the record in each
proceeding, contested or not, but, on the safety issue in an uncon-
tested case, this will be directed to the question whether the
findings are supported by evidence of record, and, of course, they
always will be.47
It should be noted that, in this description of the licensing
process, I have assumed agreement among the staff, the ACRS,
and the applicant. This may be predicted with assurance.48 If the
staff and ACRS oppose the applicant on a safety issue, the appli-
cant is not going to press for a hearing, especially at the con-
struction permit stage; if it does, the hearing examiner will
44 The functions of the hearing examiner should not be limited to receiving
the evidence. He has a further function of testing and evaluating the
evidence, and independently determining whether such evidence supports
the necessary findings consistent with the law and with regulations and
policies of the Commission.
Letter by Comm'r L. K. Olson to Mr. T. Ramey, Executive Director, ICAE,
dated Nov. 30, 1960, in 2 ICAE Staff Study 578, 585.
45 For comment on the examiner's difficult role, see Berman & Hydeman, op.
cit. supra note 13, at 128-29, 278; Kennedy & Heimaan, The AEC Regulatory
Process, in 2 JCAE Staff Study 562-63.
46 Since April 15, 1961, review of examiner's decisions has been granted by
the commission only upon petition. AEC, Rules of Practice, 10 C.F.R. § 2.752
(1959).47 Testimony of Comm'r T. S. Graham, Hearings on Radiation Safety and
Regulation Before the JCAE, supra note 14, Tune 15, 1961:
In effect we adopted a quasi-judicial procedure [with] a hearing to provide
for the public record by direct and cross examination or otherwise sufficient
evidence to sustain a finding and conclusion as to reasonable assurance of
the safety of the public.
If the record were insufficient in the opinion of the Commissioners, then
we remanded the proceeding.
48 The applicant realizing the decisive influence of the Licensing Division's
opinion and that of the ACRS on a hearing examiner, who is not equipped
to delve into the highly technical safety matters, prior to the hearing will
have resolved all technical questions with the staff and the ACRS either by
convincing [them] of the safety of his project or by making modifications in
his design. In the uncontested case the public hearing has not been a forum
for resolution of safety questions.
Reply From Atomic Industrial Forum, dated April 12, 1961, in Staff of JCAE,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 3, 9.
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scarcely be able to resolve the question against the staffs and
ACRS's views. Moreover, the Commission's method of review
offers little prospect that the examiner's decision, with ample
support in the record, will be reversed. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that, in all cases to date, the staff and the applicant have
been in agreement by the time the hearing was reached, what-
ever the number of disagreements that may have had to be
ironed out en route.
In this situation, a qualified intervenor can put the staff and
the applicant on their mettle. Although the AEC's Rules of
Practice are not explicit,49 the likelihood is considerable that an
intervenor state which had retained qualified experts could take
part in the informal discussions with the staff before the hearing
was sought. If the intervenor state was not satisfied at this stage,
it could spread its views on the record at the hearing. The inter-
venor might have little hope to persuade the hearing examiner,
but, if the case reached the Commission, the scientific ability of
certain Commissioners is such that any substantial scientific
objections to the staffs position could get thoughtful, informed
attention, and probably this would be given even though there
was sufficient evidence of record to sustain the staffs position.
The effect of this scrutiny on the Commission's other duties, if
interventions became frequent, would be catastrophic,50 but that
is a concern which would not inhibit any one intervenor.
Of greater concern to the intervenor state would be the risk
of unconscious bias on the part of the Commissioners as a result
of the dual role they are required to play: promoters and devel-
opers on the one hand; regulators, on the other. This dual re-
sponsibility has been the subject of controversy. The AEC report
defends the combination of responsibilities; 51 the JCAE staff5 2 and
49 AEC, Rules of Practice, 10 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1959), dealing with administra-
tive examination of applications, provides: "The applicant . . . may be requested
to confer informally regarding the application."
50 At present, with contested cases a rarity, commissioners estimate that they
devote from one-sixth to one-third of their time to regulatory matters. Letter
From AEC Comm'r J. S. Graham to J. T. Ramey, Exec. Director, JCAE, Oct. 28,
1960, in 2 JCAE Staff Study 514.
51 See AEC, Report on the Regulatory Program of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, in 2 JCAE Staff Study 413-20. The AEC's position has been vigorously
seconded by a leading authority in Administrative Law. See Reply From Prof.
Kenneth Culp Davis in Staff of JCAE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 29-30.
52 1 JCAE Sta Study 47-48, 64, 67.
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Messrs. Berman and Hydeman in the University of Michigan Law
School study 3 both attack it. The JCAE staff study recommends
that a three-member board (two "technically qualified") be ap-
pointed within the AEC by the President to decide all licensing
cases.5 4 The Berman-Hydeman study would place such a board
at the head of a new agency to which all the AEC's regulatory
duties and staff would be transferred. 5
If either of the proposed boards were created,55 a the oppor-
tunity for effective intervention would be increased though the
need for any intervention at all would be lessened. The board
would sit on a power or test reactor licensing case itself; its tech-
nically qualified members could evaluate the technical testimony
offered on behalf of the intervenor. If that testimony were suffi-
cient to raise doubts but not to conclude them, the board would
be capable of pushing the inquiry further.
A significant change which the creation of either board would
introduce would be to give the applicant a greater chance to
obtain a favorable ruling in cases where the staff did not agree
with it. In this way protection could be afforded against the risk
that the staff might become too safety-conscious and block needed
innovation in reactor technology.' 6 In such a situation a state, by
intervening on behalf of the proposed reactor, might considerably
increase the chance that the license would issue.
Frequent interventions leading to protracted hearings and, on
occasion, to review in the courts, could paralyze the present
adjudicatory system by imposing burdens that the Commission,
with its heavy operating and developmental responsibilities,
simply could not carry. To be sure, if the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board proposed by the JCAE staff were created, it
5 3 Berman & Hydeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at 198-99, 206-8, 231-39.
54 1 JCAE Staff Study 69-70.
55 Berman & Hydeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at 319-30.
55a Late in the session identical bills were introduced by Chairman Holifield
of the JCAE and Senator Pastore, a high-ranking Democratic member of the JCAE,
which authorized, but did not require, the Commission to create an Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board to bear licensing cases. The Board would be com-
posed as the JCAE staff study suggested, but it would be appointed by the
Commission which could reserve the power of final review of its orders. The
bills also provided for procedural changes, reducing the number of mandatory
hearings to one and relieving the burden on the ACRS to some extent. S. 2419,
H.H. 8708, 87thCong., 1st Sess. (1961). No action was taken on those bills, but
hearings on them are contemplated in the coming session.56 For a vigorous expression of this fear, see Reply From Prof. Kenneth Culp
Davis, in Staff of TCAE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 29-30.
[Vol. 50,
REGULATION OF ATOMC REACrORS
could handle a much heavier volume of adjudication, but the
burden on the AEC staff and applicants would endanger the
atomic power industry's prospects. Yet, the hazard of numerous
contests should not be exaggerated. Even for a state, the burden
of intervention in a facility licensing case is substantial enough
to deter capricious indulgence in the privilege. The fact that a
state government has staffed itself to make intelligent use of the
privilege should exert a salutary influence on the AEC staff to
conduct its evaluations with care and balance. If the state were
permitted to share in prehearing evaluations, in appropriate cases,
the likelihood of ill-considered opposition to AEC positions would
be still further diminished.
A STATE RESPONSIBILITY AS REGABDS OPERATING REACTORS
Suppose a power reactor built by an electric company has
been duly licensed by the AEC and is in operation as an integral
part of the company's electric system. It is a radiation source,
even while it is operating normally. A small quantity of radio-
active gases will be escaping from the reactor stack; a small
volume of radioactivity may be released as the reactor discharges
water; occasionally in the course of their duties, employees of
the reactor will be exposed to radiation. Standards governing all
these releases of radioactivity will be found in the reactor license
and, basically, in part 20 of the AEC's Regulations, "Standards
for Protection Against Radiation." Is subsection c of section 274
to be interpreted as pre-empting a state from exercising any
authority over the by-product materials that are the sources of
this radiation?
Section 274 predicates the exercise of state power on the ma-
terials with respect to which it is exercised. 57 It predicates the
federal power it reserves on various bases: materials by implica-
tion in one instance (state power over special nuclear materials
exists only as to "quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass"),
on facilities ("the construction and operation of any production
or utilization facility"), and on functions (export or import of
materials, ocean or sea disposal of materials, disposal of materials
when special hazards lead the Commission to impose a license).58
57 Act, § 274.b., 73 Stat. 688, 42 U.S.C. § 2022(b) (Supp. II, 1960).58 Act, § 274.c., 73 Stat. 689, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (Supp. II, 1960).
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The resulting overlap of state and federal authority in a scheme
which was designed to prevent, in the words of the JCAE report, 9
"dual or concurrent jurisdiction" calls for clarification.
Such clarification is not to be found in the AEC "Criteria for
Guidance of States and the AEC in the Discontinuance of AEC
Authority" 0 or in the State Radiation Control Act which the
Council of State Governments has drafted in cooperation with
the AEC for enactment to implement section 274 agreements.,'
The State Act is not unlike the typical state acts which have been
adopted in recent years. They purport to confer regulatory
power over radiation on state agencies without any express
limitation to areas not pre-empted by the federal legislation. It
is startling to realize that, if the exclusive federal jurisdiction
theory expressed in the 1959 JCAE report accompanying section
27463 is accepted, nearly all the state legislation and regulations
designed to control radiation are invalid except insofar as they
apply to radium, x-rays, and accelerators. 4 Take, as an egregious
example, the California statute which was passed in June of this
year and becomes effective in September as chapter 7 of the
Health and Safety Code, "Control of Radioactive Contamination
of the Environment." 5 One of its provisions declares: "No person
shall operate a nuclear reactor . . .which could, as a result of
routine operations, accident, or negligence, significantly con-
taminate the environment with radioactive material, without first
instituting and maintaining an adequate program of radiological
monitoring" approved by the State Board of Health. 6 Even if
the State Board of Health were willing to accept monitoring ar-
rangements set up in the AEC license, it would have no legal
standing to assert its interest.
The California statute in this respect comes close to a licensing
requirement. Suppose that the Massachusetts Department of
59 S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) 9.
60 1 CCH Atom. Energy L. Rep. f1 8527.
61 As approved by The Committee of State Officials in Suggested State Legis-
lation of the Council of State Governments, August 25, 1960. BNA, Atomic Ind.
Rep., Laws and Regulations 205:21.
62 For a collection of state laws, see id. at 205.
63 See supra note 7.
64 These are excluded by the definitions of by-product, source, and special
nuclear materials to which federal authority is confined. See Act, § 11.e., x., y.,
68 Stat. 922, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e), (x), (y) (Supp. II, 1960).
65 Cal. Health & Safety Code H§ 25600-08.
66 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25607.
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Public Health were simply to complain of the escape of radio-
active gases from the stack of the Yankee reactor in quantities
that were in excess of limits set in the AEC's regulation and
accepted as proper in Massachusetts. Would the Department
have any legal authority to back up its complaints or would it
have to depend on the AEC for enforcement action? This would
provide a chance to argue that the reservation of federal power
over the operation of a reactor did not oust a state of power over
by-product materials merely because they happen to have em-
anated from the reactor.
It is to be hoped that uncertainties such as these can be
clarified in such agreements with states as the AEC executes
under section 274. Subsection 1 permits the "Commission in
carrying out its licensing and regulatory responsibilities . . . to
enter into agreements with any State, or group of States, to
perform inspections or other functions on a cooperative basis as
the Commission deems appropriate." 7 Happily, moreover, com-
pliance and enforcement activities in this field ordinarily are
carried out with maximum emphasis on voluntary compliance
and minimum stress on legal remedies. Accordingly, tests of
enforcement powers are not likely to be frequent. This phe-
nomenon does much to explain the continued coexistence of state
and federal regulations in a field that, in contemplation of law,
appears to have been pre-empted by the Congress.
OT= STATE PowEIs OvEn REAcroRs
The Act has two saving clauses with respect to state power.
Section 271 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local
agency with respect to the generation, sale or transmission of
"168electric power. Subsection k of section 274 has added the
following: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect
the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities
for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." 69
Provisions of this sort open the door wide to speculation. I
shall note only two questions with respect to reactors which have
been the subject of some discussion.
6 7 Act, § 274.i., 73 Stat. 691 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(i) (Supp. II, 1960).
68Act, § 271, 68 Stat. 960 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1958).69 Act, § 274 k., 73 Stat. 691 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (Supp. II, 1960).
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In some states, utility commissions have the power to pass
on major construction by companies subject to their jurisdiction;
more generally they have the power to pass on security issues to
finance such construction. Suppose a state commission were con-
vinced that it would be imprudent for an electric company operat-
ing within the state to build a power reactor. Or suppose it were
to rule that, though a power reactor of a well-established type
might be approved, the new concept which the company was
advancing would not be. These judgments, though perhaps
reflecting the commission's doubts as to the safety of the proposed
reactor, would still seem to me a valid exertion of state authority
"with respect to the generation... of electric power."
The Illinois Commerce Commission has approved the con-
struction and operation of the Commonwealth Edison Company's
large reactor at Dresden, Illinois.70 In the two proceedings the
Commission made specific findings relating to the various safety
features of the reactor, while taking note of the AEC's own
licensing operations. It seems reasonably clear that the safety
evaluation was, by AEC standards, a superficial one. There is no
evidence in the opinions that the Commission was concerned
lest it be trespassing on pre-empted territory. Of course, if a
commission were to declare its intention to grant its approval of a
reactor's construction only after an independent determination
of the safety of the design, conflict with federal authority would
be hard to avoid.
The most powerful lever for state control of reactor construc-
tion may be the authority to zone land, ordinarily exercised by
municipalities but sometimes by larger units including, occasion-
ally, the states. A general zoning ordinance prohibiting industrial
uses within a zone would certainly bar a reactor even though it
were licensed by the AEC for the site in question. This was my
opinion even before the adoption of subsection k of section 274.71
70 In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Co., I]l. Commerce Comm'n, No.
43336, Sept. 24, 1956 (construction) 1 CCH Atom. Energy L. Rep. II 8522; Mar.
27, 1958 (operation) id. ff 8524. In the latter proceeding, the Illinois Commission
ordered the company to file monthly reports as to its inventory of fuel elements.
This was superseded by a requirement that it file copies of its Material Status
reort to the AEC and of its reports on operations required by its AEC license.
IT. If 8532.
71 See Cavers, supra note 8, at 36. For a more extensive consideration of the
problem, see Adams, Regulation of Health and Safety in Private Atomic Energy
Activities: A Problem in Federal-State Relationships, 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 163,
185-91 (1958).
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Suppose, however, an electric company obtained a license to build
on unzoned land, and the state legislature passed a "zoning" law
similar to the bill which is reported to have died in the Arizona
legislature a few years ago. This bill would have prohibited the
construction of any reactor or missile plant within 60 miles of a
city of more than 100,000 population, or within 40 miles of a city
of more than 10,000.72 It is said that such a bill would have
"effectively outlawed" reactors and missile plants in 80 or more
states.73
Probably safety was a primary consideration among the factors
that inspired the Arizona bill, although conceivably safety against
providing attractive targets for enemy attacks may have been the
dominant motivation. Suppose, however, that a legislature can-
didly declared that its policy, during the developmental period of
atomic power, was to prevent the siting of reactors in sufficient
proximity to its cities to subject their populations to anxiety,
however safe, in objective terms, the reactors might be. This
protection of the amenities of urban existence seems to me a
purpose distinct from "protection against radiation hazards." I
should think the state law would be sheltered by subsection k
against attack based on a theory of pre-emption. If subsection k
were held not to protect it or if an amendment were to withdraw
the protection, a nice case would be posed as to the extent of
federal power. If the reactor were simply a part of an electric
power system, ministering to no special federal objectives in its
particular location, I should not be surprised if the authority of
the state were held to prevail.
This review of the opportunities for-and limitations on-state
participation in reactor licensing and regulation makes it evident
that the state which, without surrendering its independence,
establishes and maintains a close working relationship with AEC,
will be able as a consequence to discharge its responsibilities more
effectively than would otherwise be the case. The Commonwealth
of Kentucky, as a pioneer in the implementation of section 274,
should be able to achieve such a relationship-to the advantage
of its own citizens and industries and of the national atomic
program.
72 McAdams, Regulatory and Public Relations Problems in the Atomic Age,
Dec. 2, 1958, in Staff of TCAE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 359.
78 Ibid.
